I did a stint in the late 70's at Baer Field as airport security. I had a lttle training, as basically assisted the screeners there with any obnoxious clients. The procedure was simple: if anyone made jokes about hijackings, I was to inform them that it was not permissible to joke about such things and if they persisted, I was to call on the airport police to take over the interaction. In high school, two classmates spent a weekend in jail because one joked to the other that they ought to hijack the plane and were overheard by a sky marshall. They were given accomdations in the best Philadelphia jail (remember Mayor Frank Rizzo and burning up of the tenements?) and were the guests of the Federal District Court on Monday morning.
The techniques were simple and effective. Sky Marshalls were used extensively and effectively. The unannounced side vacations to the Havana airport where one could view Cuban soldiers if one had a window seat ceased.
Flash forward to today. An army of officious looking personnel with no real authority and the task of screening a multitude of passengers. Airports and air travel has grown extensively since the 70's, so too has security. And so has the procedures. Certainly so have the procedures.
We are faced with increased scale and anonymity in today's society. As ones credit score has replaced the five C's of credit and a subject examination of a borrower (debt to income ratio, job security, living stability, etc), so too are the airport procedures given over to treating everyone as one.
The huge elephant in the room is that there is a way to narrow down the lists of suspects: profiling.
Now if you think I'm suggesting racial profiling, think again. When we focused on everyone from Arab Muslim countries, resentment was created. We treated young men and women from Omen and Tunisia, two progressive Arabic countries (think of the progressivism of the turn of the century, not the bastardized edition that exists today). And from the Asiatic countries as well.
Profiling as I know it has been developed by the FBI (and poorly represented on the crime drama, "Criminal Minds") to develop a system similar to the DSM used by psychiatry, but for serial and mass murders. Through thousands of interviews of these types of folk, they have been very successful at finding them. Retired FBI profiler, John Douglas, www.mindhunter.com, has written several good books such as, "The Mind Hunter, Anatomy of a Motive, and The Cases that Haunt Us"
As I recollect, this profiling is based upon several factors.
Extensive and Intensive interviewing: this FBI unit at Quantico has spent thousands of hours since the 60's compiling data through interviews of mass murders and serial killers. Richard Speck was the first.
Modus Operandi changes. As serial murders continue, they improve, so their MO changes. This has been the biggest drawback in law enforcement when they don't see that same thing each time, then they change their tactics.
Develop a classification system. It allows handy generalizations.
Have a contingent of specially trained agents with the gift of profiling. No matter how extensive the classification system, an agent must have a special gift of profiling. They seem to be born with it. It cannot be given, but can be developed.
So, on to the airport.
I've been struck at the warnings given beforehand of the 9-11 hijackers, the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber. Information that was obscured in various govt agencies that didn't communicate with each other, pieces hidden in various parts of the Fed govt, and warnings given by people (the father of the underwear bomber, the Actor James Woods who made 4 of the 9-11 hijackers a month before on the Boston-Los Angeles flight). I had a coworker whose family worked for the CIA (he worked in Air America in the 70's) who laid out the cell structure on Al Qaeda in the US for me in the late 90's. Federal law enforcement knew of Hezbollah's money-raising in the US through mid-level rackets (selling North Carolina cigarettes in Detroit for example)and the rules allowed knives under 4 inches and box cutters on board. The information was there, just not properly collated.
So, after 9-11, the Feds (Republicans in charge, remember?) dismantled a privately run system, ruining a man's living (read, "Unsafe at Any Altitude") simply on the premise that , "we have to do something to sooth the fears of the public". So we had a grossly ineffective new, inexperienced system that failed security tests 50% of the times vs the former system failure rate of 10%.
What kept us safe after 9-11? Inability to improve the MO. To become competent at a task, one must practice, practice, practice. The 9-11 hijackers made dry runs before the final one. As entry systems improved (not US, but European), and we clobbered Al Qaeda initially, they've had to rely on less trained and ineffective bombers. Let's face it, both the shoe and underwear bombers were highly incompetent. The terrorists can change the MO, but they can't improve upon it due to their agents cannot do dry runs.
Changing the rules about what can be carried on? btw...I can carry on a pair of metal scissors with less than 4 inch blades or knitting needles. And as prisoners have taught us, homemade weapons can be fashioned out of plastic dinnerware. Maybe, it increases safety. It would have prevented box cutters from being used. However, I have been carrying in my laptop case a letter opener with just about 4 inch blades that folds back into itself. Extended with the handle it measures 7 inches. I carry it on the street for personal protection.
Greater awareness aboard? More security measures on the jet? Yes.
Terrorist Watch List? It's like the Hotel California, you can be checked on to it anytime, but you can never leave. I have a host of bad accounts that believe I can put them on it, so they keep in touch and keep payments up to date. It's not a very good measure as they can put anyone on it, and usually do.
Airport security. Airports since the 70's have been designed for security. They had plain clothes and uniformed officers, hidden rooms and are trained to sweep a suspicious person from the crowd in the terminal or concourses into a side room without most noticing. This occurred in Houston in 1993 when approaching the customs checkpoint to two men with metal cases.
Warning Levels...give me a break.
Other stuff? Count on the passengers not to take any threat lying down. After all, if I'm going down, I'm going to do my best to make sure to keep myself busy doing all that I can do to make the perps last descent hellish.
Carry on a container of pig grease? Just a thought.
Labels: airport, FBI, profiling, security, TSA